A review of the politics around futures trading since the 1890s does give one a sense of déjà vu.
Holbrook Working
The historical writings of Holbrook Working frequently provide insight and a sense of constancy in how to frame the ongoing (tumultuous) debate on futures trading.
Holbrook Working was a Stanford University professor whose writings on the economic role of futures trading are considered fundamental to our present understanding of these markets. His work spanned the 1920s through the 1970s. In 1970, Working described how fragile the existence of the futures-trading business in Chicago had been since its inception in the nineteenth century. Working (1970) wrote that there were a handful of conditions for a futures market to survive and prosper. We are finding out yet again how important one of these principles is, and that is that: "There must exist adequate public recognition of the economic usefulness of futures markets." According to Working, the economic purpose served by commodity futures markets is to allow commercial participants to hedge prohibitively expensive inventories. The role of the speculator, then, is to take on and manage this risk. If one accepts this framework, then one does not see futures exchanges as casinos.
Working's T Index
In 1960, there was actually an inadequacy of speculation in the agricultural futures markets. In other words, there was insufficient risk capital for managing commercial-hedging risk. A U.S. federal agency (which preceded the CFTC) provided data that classified market participation as either hedging or speculation. With this data, one could construct ratios to see how much excess speculation (if any) there was over hedging needs. Holbrook Working created a simple ratio to do just that. This is Working's Speculative T index.
In a University of Illinois paper, Sanders et al. (2008) studied whether there was excessive speculation in the agricultural futures markets, updating previous studies that began with Working (1960) , and using Working's T index.
Working's speculative index specifically "reflects the extent by which the level of speculation exceeds the minimum necessary to absorb long and short hedging, recognizing that long and short hedging positions could not always be expected to offset each other [,] even in markets where these positions were of comparable magnitudes," explained Peck (1980) , as cited by Sanders et al.(2008) .
After calculating Working's T index across agricultural futures markets, the University of Illinois economists found no pervasive evidence that recent speculative levels were in excess of those recorded historically for agricultural futures markets, even after accounting for index trader positions.
On October 20th, 2009, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) released three years of enhanced market-participant data for 22 commodity futures markets in a new "Disaggregated Commitments of Traders" (DCOT) report.
The release of this data was important because one could then evaluate whether the balance of outright position-taking in the U.S. exchange-traded oil derivatives markets had been excessive relative to hedging demand during the previous three years. One could do so by calculating T indices for the US crude oil market.
Using this data and with some notable caveats, one could conclude that speculative positiontaking in the US oil futures markets did not appear excessive when compared to the scale of commercial hedging at the time, according to Till (2009) . One has to be careful with how strongly one states this paper's conclusions since, for example, the paper did not examine whether there was excessive speculation in the oil markets in other venues besides the US oil futures markets.
Exhibit 2 provides an updated chart of the levels of Holbrook Working's Speculative T index for US oil futures markets through February 2011. 
Commodity Index Activity
In addition to the CFTC's Disaggregated Commitments of Traders report, one can also directly examine CFTC data on index investment.
Did commodity index investments in 2008 cause the 7-month oil-price rally that culminated in July of 2008? According to data released by the CFTC on September 11th, 2008, this is an unlikely cause, given that total over-the-counter (OTC) and on-exchange commodity index investment activity in oil-futures-contract-equivalents actually declined from December 31st, 2007 through June 30th, 2008. 
No Smoking Gun
In early 2010, a futures exchange spokesman stated that the regulatory attention on oil markets had shifted to a focus on "market concentration and not about speculation" because the evidence on excessive speculation did not bear out. "There was no smoking gun," reported Collins (2010) .
Risk Management
Besides the challenges of defending the economic role of commodities derivatives trading, market participants also face striking risk-management challenges.
The following section briefly draws from Till (2008) in discussing the apparent risk-management lapses at three large institutions and summarizes what the lessons from these debacles are.
International Oil Company
In 2007, an International Oil Company in the Chicago suburbs ran afoul of market-conduct laws and rules, as enforced by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and by the U.S. Department of Justice, for trading activities of the previous five years.
In one particular case, the civil and criminal fines far exceeded the market-risk of the activities, illustrating where the risk-management priorities need to be for large participants in the commodity markets.
The key risk-management lesson from that debacle was to establish clear-cut compliance and ethics programs, not just for the trading staff but also for senior management. Also, prospective traders entering into large-scale derivatives trading operations need to be as (or more) knowledgeable about regulatory rules and laws, as they are with sophisticated market risk-management techniques.
Canadian Bank
At the end of April 2007, a Canadian bank announced trading losses of $350 to $400 million Canadian dollars. These losses were later revised upwards to $680-million Canadian dollars, which was higher than the bank's revenue from trading during the previous year, according to The Desk (2007a).
Unfortunately, the bank's auditors had found that the bank's over-the-counter natural-gas book had been seriously mismarked. The auditors reported that they had never seen such a large discrepancy between the marks that were used, and market value, according to Mavin (2007) . • Include in the code-of-conduct document what sort of broker "perks" are unacceptable for traders, and "let nothing be left to common sense." • Ensure that one's trading activity is diversified across more than one broker.
We have to conclude that for large-scale commodity-trading efforts, the complexity may not be in market-risk monitoring, but in relatively-simply described operational controls, which must be rigorously applied throughout a large organization. According to Cameron and Lucchetti (2008) , "The futures brokerage blamed the loss on a failure in its systems." Apparently, the clearing firm did not have automatic limits in the sizing of futures trades executed electronically, when the operator was a registered representative of the firm.
As a consequence of the wheat loss, the FCM's CEO stated that "the company would introduce limits on positions taken by all customers and traders," reported Cameron and Lucchetti (2008) . The FCM also took other remedial actions to restore customer and shareholder confidence in its risk-management infrastructure.
The lessons we learn from this trading mishap are to impose strict position limits in all electronic trading systems and to restore customer confidence by taking immediate action.
None of these three examples involve complex mathematical issues; they can each be summarized briefly and simply as fundamental control problems. That said, this statement is admittedly not fair to individuals at large organizations. Employees at large companies operate in extremely complex social environments. Frequently, for individuals working at large companies, one can liken employment to a sumo-wrestling match. From the outside, it does not look like anything much is getting done, but just staying in the ring is actually the accomplishment.
The real conclusion from this section might be an insight from a textbook, which is not considered a risk-management primer: Good to Great. In the main, a large organization can only do well when it implements a handful of simple concepts, which it consistently applies in scale, and across time, by individuals who all share common business values. In the case of large commodity derivatives trading companies, an emphasis on:
• complying with regulatory rules and laws; • valuing instruments based on pricing sources genuinely independent of the trading team; and • imposing strict position limits in all electronic trading systems are clearly core principles that all stakeholders in institutionally-sized commodity trading firms should embrace.
Commodity Indices
Commodity investors have had their own set of challenges in dealing with the complexities of the commodity markets. This has resulted in the design of new types of commodity indices.
Commodity futures investments can potentially be a store-of-value hedge for portfolios that have concentrated risk to the fortunes of US-dollar-denominated financial assets. The issue has been how to structure one's commodity futures investments so as not to have a massive amount of negative carry in doing so. This is plainly too expensive a hedge.
A number of commodity-index providers have created a new generation of indices, which attempt to methodically provide exposure to spot commodity prices while minimizing the carry costs of such investments, particularly in the energy sector.
Exhibit 4 shows how volatile the crude oil futures curve can be. In 2007, index providers came up with different ways of handling these issues, including launching constant-maturity indices, where one's exposure would be concentrated in the presumably more stable back-end of the curve. Index providers also created new futures roll strategies that explicitly took into consideration how to maximize positive roll returns or at least minimize negative roll returns.
Each generation of new indices has converged to what are essentially rule-based strategies rather than actually being straightforward indices, which leaves open the question: is it possible to have "an active index"?
A natural question in viewing the proliferation of commodity indices is to ask: which approach is best? This depends on an investor's underlying rationale for investing in commodities.
If the rationale is solely absolute returns, then investors need to be very careful about the termstructure properties of the commodity index. Over the long term, commodities with positive returns have been structurally backwardated.
One also needs an appropriate rebalancing routine to capture the portfolio-level effects arising from the mean-reverting properties of spot-commodity prices.
But if an investor's primary purpose for investing in commodities is for diversification and to specifically protect one's portfolio against an oil shock, then one needs to ensure that the commodity investment has a healthy, structural weighting to the petroleum complex.
Some investors use commodity investments as a call option on Asian growth. In this case, the metals component of the commodities portfolio should be heavily weighted.
If instead the objective is short-term gains without regard for a fundamental view or for diversification, then the best tools have been long/short algorithms based on momentum rules.
Fuertes, Miffre, and Rallis (2010) describe a further enhancement to this idea. In their strategy, they double-sort on both momentum and term-structure signals to decide upon which commodities to invest in, given that both, individually, signals have been historically profitable. 
Commodity Structured Products

Metals-Backed ETFs
The launch of several exchange-traded funds (ETFs), backed by a variety of physical metals in addition to gold, has provided commodity investors with new investment options. It appears that retail investors are intuitively re-creating the Bretton Woods accord: by holding metals-backed financial instruments. The US dollar had been precisely that until the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971.
Oil Investment Proxies
In addition to directly investing in oil futures, one has further alternatives with various oil proxies. The following are the returns for several of these proxies during 2009. Exxon Mobile declined by about -13%; buying and rolling oil futures contracts returned +13%; while the currencies of oilexporting countries outperformed an oil futures investment. The Canadian dollar rallied 16%, and Norway's currency returned 20%, each with respect to the U.S. dollar.
If regulation regarding commodities futures trading ever does become draconian, one consequence may be that investors will have to switch from the futures markets to physical-commodity-backed ETFs and/or commodity currencies in order to express directional views on commodity markets. But at this time, there is no indication that this will need to be the case.
Outlook
In making predictions and observations about the commodity markets, it is admittedly difficult to do so during times of currency revaluations. For example, at the time of writing this article, the price of crude oil was above $80 per barrel. This dollar price may look high, but in gold terms, the price of oil was roughly equal to its long-term average, which is shown on Exhibit 6. In examining how much spare capacity OPEC has, it does not appear that oil prices will have the propensity to spike, so any rallies may have to be based on currency shifts. See Exhibit 7.
In reviewing the content of this article, a reader may note that successfully navigating the commodity markets' challenges relies on knowledge of political history, risk-management principles, quantitative techniques, currency trends, and fundamental analysis. In summary, those are the keys to intelligent commodity trading. 
